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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal from conviction of the Defendant/ 
Appellant of a charge of theft by deception, of an aMount 
of over $2,000.00, a felony of the second degree. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant/Appellant was charged, tried and convicted 
of theft by deception involving a sum greater than 
$2,000.00, a felony of the second degree. Defendant 
waived a jury and the case was tried to the Honorable 
Bryant H. Croft and Defendant was found guilty as 
charged. Defendant's Motion for New Trial was denied 
and this appeal was then filed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant/Appellant seeks reversal of the lower 
court's conviction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 3, 1976, James Dennis Smith and his 
wife Eileen, purchased a 1973 Chevrolet Monte Carlo auto-
mobile from Love Motors, in part owned by the Appellant, 
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Kenneth M. Forshee, Jr. The car, at the time of sale, 
allegedly indicated approximately 33,000 miles on the 
odometer. Subsequently the Smiths allededly found a 
lubrication sticker indicating the vehicle at the date 
on the sticker had in excess of 71,000 miles. The 
Smiths brought this to the attention of one J.R. McKnight 
of the Utah State Motor Vehicle Business Administration 
and to the attention of the Appellant. Negotiations 
were had between the Smiths and the Appellant, Forshee. 
Forshee ~ffered to repurchase the vehicle or replace 
it with a l~ke model with acceptable mileage which was 
refused, the Smiths indicating they were pleased with 
the vehicle and did not want to give it up; Forshee 
offered also to rebuild the engine in the vehicle, 
guarantee the transmission for 60,000 miles and over-
haul the carburetor, which offer the Smiths accepted. 
Shortly thereafter Forshee was arrested, jailed and 
charged with theft by deception under §76-6-405, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953 as amended 1973, of a sum in excess 
of $2,000.00, a felony of the second degree. The 
Defendant was tried, therefore, and upon the State's 
having rested its case, the Defendant moved to dismiss 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for having failed to prove a theft of over $1,000.00, 
which Motion was denied, trial was completed, Defendant 
was convicted of theft by deception, a felony of the 
second degree, his Motion for New Trial was denied and 
he appealed therefrom. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. WHERE A PERSON ALLEGEDLY ALTERS THE 
INDICATED MILEAGE ON THE ODOMETER 
OF A MOTIR VEHICLE HE SHOULD BE 
CHARGED UNDER THE UTAH STATUTE 
SPECIFICALLY PROHIBITING SUCH AN ACT. 
It is a general rule of statutory construction that 
where two statutes treat of the same subject matter, the 
one general and the other specific in its provisions, the 
specific provision controls. Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake 
County, 60 Utah 423, 209 P. 207; State ex rel P.S.C. v. 
Southern Pacific Company, 95 Utah 84, 79 P.2d. 25; State 
v. Burnham, 87 Utah 445, 49 P.2d. 963; P.I.E. v. State Tax 
Commission, 7 Utah 2d. 15, 316 P.2d. 549; Bateman v. Board 
of Examiners, 7 Utah 2d. 221, 322 P.2d. 381; Bureau of 
Revenue v. Western Electric Company, 89 New Mexico 468, 
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553 P.2d. 1275 (1976); Holder v. State, 556 P.2d. 1049 
(Oklahoma Cr. 1976) and more specifically; absent clear 
expression of intent to make existing special statutes 
inapplicable, a special statute is to be given effect. 
Kuckler v. Whistler, 552, P.2d 18 (Colorado 1976). 
It may be argued here, where discussing the theft 
by deception provision of §76-6-405 vs the odometer pro-
visions of §41-6-176 et sec of the Motor Vehicle Code, 
that there is no conflict of the two statutes. There 
should not be a conflict because there is no indication 
anywhere tt.2t tr>.c. theft by deception statute was ever 
intended by the legislature to apply to the instant 
situation. Once the prosecution chose to attempt to so 
apply said statute then a conflict arises in that at 
that point, the theft by deception statute is being applied 
to a situation wherein the dominant act or unlawful act 
is that of altering the indicated mileage on an odometer 
with the apparent intent to reduce the true number of 
miles indicated upon the odometer guage, which is the very 
act made unlawful by §41-6-177{1) and made a misdemeanor 
offense by §4l-6-l78,Utah Code Annotated 1953. Therefore, 
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if the theft by deception statute is to be applied
1
it is 
on its face a general statute dealing with theft by 
deception1 in general with any deceptive act, whereas 
the odometer statutes deal specifically with deception 
as to indicated mileage of motor vehicles. It is clear 
then, that the legislature has actively considered the 
practice of altering indicated mileage on odometers 
of motor vehicles and has decreed that to so do is to be 
a misdemeanor offense. It is not at all clear that the 
legislature has considered the alteration of indicated 
mileage on the odometers of a motor vehicle in the 
context of a theft by deception. 
The Supreme Court of Kansas had occasion to consider 
a similar situtation in its recent case of State v. 
Kliewer, 504 P.2d 580, 210 Kansas 82 (1973); wherein the 
defendant had been found to have sold an automobile with an 
altered odometer and was convicted of unlawful business 
practices and of altering the mileage on an odometer "with 
the intent to reduce the number of miles of use thereof 
indicated on such gauge .... " Both were misdemeanor off-
enses, but one statute was general, dealing with business 
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practices and the other specific, dealing with altering 
indicated odometer readings. The court then said, ( p 
585 P.2d. repts.) 
"under these circumstances where there 
is a conflict between a statute dealing 
generally with a subject and another 
statute dealing specifically with a 
certain phase of it, the specific statute 
will be favored over the general statute 
and controls. (State v. Christensen, 166 
Kansas 152, 157, 199 P.2d. 475; Moody v. 
Edmondson, 176 Kansas 116, 120, 269 P.2d. 
462: Ferrellgas Corporation v. Phoenix 
Insurar,ce- :ompany, 187 Kansas 530, 535, 
358 P.2d 86; and Barten v. Turkey Creek 
W.J.~. No. 32, 200 Kansas 489, 506, 438 
P. 2d 732" 
By adhering to the above principle the clear 
legislative intent is given full force and effect, in 
tha~ only in the specific statute is it clear just what 
the intent of the legislature was with regard to the 
specific subject matter. Here it is clear that 
the legislature intended the act of alteration of in-
dicated mileage on a motor vehicle was to be an offense, 
but one of misdemeanor severity. It was clearly 
not intended to be a second degree felony, nor did the 
legislature intend that an ingenous prosecutor should 
be able to circumvent the Motor Vehicle Code provisions 
by concocting a theory that would circumvent an already 
enacted statute dealing with specific subject matter. 
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POINT II. THE CRIME OF THEFT BY DECEPTION 
IS NOT ESTABLISHED IN THE ABSENCE 
OF EVIDENCE SHOWING TH~T THE ~LAIMED 
VICTIM HAS SUSTAINED A PECUNIARY OR 
PROPER~Y LOSS BY REASON OF THE 
TRANSACTION RELIED UPON. 
Prior to the enactmert of t!1e new Utah Criminal 
Code the offense parallell to theft by deception was 
theft of obtaining money or property by false pretenses. 
The Court's attention is drawn to twc such Utah cases; 
Sta~e v. Caspersen et. al., 71 Ctah 68, 262 P. 292 (1927) 
arid State v. Morris, 85 Utah 210, 38 P.2d. 1097 (1934). 
The Court in Caspersen said at page 75 of 71 Utah Reports: 
"that a pretense false in fact and an actual 
fraud resulting in prejudice (emphasis supplied) 
are essent~al elements of the crime in question, 
and must be proved to establish guilt, are 
general principles of law which we recognize and 
approve. The actual fraud and prejudice 
required, however, is determined according 
to the situtation of the victim immediately after 
he parts with his property. If he gets what 
was pretended and what he bargained for, 
there is no fraud or prejudice. But if he then 
stands without the right or thing it was pre-
tended he would then have, he has been de-
frauded and prejudiced by reason of the false 
pretense and the offense is complete ... " 
The Court in the Morris case (supra) cites the above 
language of Caspersen and goes on ta say on page 216 of 86 
Utah Reports 
"Thus in the instant case the purchaser (com-
plaining witness) received a part but not all 
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that it bargained for. The only reasonable 
inference, however, which may be drawn from 
the evidence before us is that the purchasing 
corporation received, and at the time of the 
trial had sufficient security to satisfy, 
the amount owing on the contract, which it 
purchased. Under such facts may it be 
said that the defendant is guilty of the 
crime for which he stands convicted? We 
are of the opinion that the question must be 
answered in the negative. Before a recovery 
may be had in a civil action on the grounds 
fo fraud, it must be established that the 
complaining party has sustained some damage 
on account of the fraud. Were this a civil 
case in which the purchasing company was 
seeking to recover a money judgment against 
the defendant on account of the fraud com-
plained o~ no recovery could be had because 
the ev1jenc2 fails to show that the pur-
chasing company sustained any injury: The 
mere fact that a party to a transaction 
may not have received all he bargained for 
does not give rise to civil liability. For 
stronger reasons the crime of obtaining money 
by false pretenses is not established in the 
absence of evidence showing or tending to show 
that the claimed victim has sustained a 
pecuniary or property loss by reason of the 
transaction relied upon." (emphasis added) 
In the instant case the transcript indicates 
that the vehicle in question was purchased for 
Eileen Smith, one of the complainants. (Transcript 
page 101 lines 1-4) The complainants testified that 
they liked the vehicle and were satisfied with it 
except for a minor oil consumption matter. (Transcript 
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page 73-74; page 98 line 6-8; page 101 line 24-25) 
The complainants purchased the automobile for $2,830.00. 
(Transcript page 136 line 10) The record contains un-
rebutted evidence that the average wholesale value of 
that particular vehicle was $2,975.00 and that the 
average retail value of said automobile was at that time 
approximately $750.00 higher or $3,725.00. (Transcript 
page 139 lines 8-17) 
It is quite clear then that the complainants were 
not prejudiced at the conclusion of the transaction in 
question. They obtained a quid-pro-quo, the fair 
market value of the automobile at wholesale was greater 
than the price paid by the Smiths. The fair market 
value at retail was clearly in excess of the price paid 
by the complainants. 
Theft is defined in §76-6-404 Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as "a person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the property of 
another with purpose to deprive him thereof." Theft is 
traditionally viewed as involving a situation in which 
the complainant loses his property or money and suffers 
a demonstrable loss measured as the fair market value 
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of the property of which he was deprived. Here, the 
Smiths testify that they liked the vehicle obtained, 
in fact to the extent of being unwilling to sell it 
back to Forshee or to have it replaced with a like 
year and model Chevrolet Monte Carlo with fewer 
miles. (Transcript page 97 line 21; page 98 line 15) 
Mrs. Eileen Smith wanted that particular automobile! 
The complainants suffered no pecuniary or property 
loss as a result of the instant transaction. 
The ~rcs~ctuion, at the time of argument of 
Defendant's !Appellant's) Motion to Dismiss submitted 
to the Court a Memorandum citing two California cases; 
People v. Ross 25 California App. 3rd 190, 100 Cal. 
Rptr. 703 (1972) and People v. Hess, 10 California App. 
3rd. 1071, 90 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1970). The Hess case 
(supra) involved a situation in which the Defendant, 
Hess, fraudulently obtained a registration certificate 
on a stolen mixed breed poney, represented to be a 
blooded Arabian horse by the name of Ingaia worth over 
$3,000.00 and who then sold the horse receiving $550.00 
from the complainant. Hess tried to claim the severety 
of the crime should have been measured by subtracting 
the $200.00 actual worth of the horse from the complain-
ant's out of pocket loss. The Court pointed out there 
10 
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that Hess didn't have title to the pony and couldn't 
convey anything to the complainant. The Ross case 
(supra) used as precedent the Hess (supra) case and 
People v. Brady, 275 California App. 2d. 984, 80 Cal. 
Rptr. 418. Both Hess and Brady involved sale, pursuant 
to misrepresentation of terms, of stolen property 
and appear to be cases where the prosecution could not 
get the Defendant for the theft of the subject of 
the sale but could only make out a case on the 
fraudulent sale, which was, in any event, of property 
which neither Defendant had title and, therefore, out 
of pocket loss of complainant was the amount that changed 
hands. The Ross case (supra) is admittedly parallel to 
the instant case except that Ross sold 5 automobiles 
with altered odometers to other used vehicle dealers. 
The Ross case (supra), however, is not proper precedent 
for the Utah Courts to use to overrule the Utah cases 
of Caspersen and Morris (supra) : Ross at present is an 
anomalous result which has not been validated by the 
California Supreme Court, and is founded in faulty 
reasoning as will be discussed later. 
11 
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It should be pointed out to the Court that under 
our statute, theft is the crime. Theft meaning a pecuniary 
or property loss of some degree. A theft may be pre-
petrated in many ways, deception being only one of 
the ways; deception is not a crime in and of itself. 
POINT III. A CRIMINAL STATUTE THAT DOES NOT 
CLEARLY INFORM THE AVERAGE PERSON OF NORMAL 
INTELLIGENCE AS TO JUST WHAT CONDUCT IS TO 
BE PROSCRIBED WORKS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
OF THE LAW AGAINST HIM. 
As the Court said in State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 
2nd. 3 4 3 , 4 c; < P. 2d. 14 6 ( 19 6 9) , 
"The well established rule is that a statute 
creatlng a crime should be sufficiently 
certain that persons of ordinary intelligence 
who desire to obey the law may know how to 
conduct themselves in conformity with it ... 
State v. Musser, 118 Utah 537, 223, P.2d 
193; U.S. vs. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 
u.s. 81, 41 S.Ct. 298, 65 L.Ed. 516; Lauzetta 
v. New Jersey, 306 U.S.451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 
83 L.Ed. 888, a fair and logical concomitant 
of that rule is that such a penal statute 
should be similarly clear, specific and under-
standable as to the penalty imposed for its 
violation." 
The Court's attention in this regard in again 
drawn to State v. Casperson (supra) where the court 
said p. 74, 71 Utah Rprts.: 
12 
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"Such statutes, like all other criminal ones 
must be construed strictly as against 
accused person and liberally in their favor 
and nothing not within their words held to 
be within their meaning. 2 Bishop Criminal 
Law (9th Ed.) §415." (emphasis supplied) 
Appellant is aware of the provisions of 
§76-1-106 which provide that the rule of strict 
construction is not applicable to the new Utah 
Criminal Code, but would point out that the last sentence 
thereof refers to §76-1-104 " ... to effect the objects 
of the law and general purposes of §76-1-104." Which in 
part says in §76-1-104 (2) and (3) " ... the provision 
of the code shall be construed in accordance with these 
purposes ... (2) define adequately (emphasis supplied) the 
conduct and mental state which constitute each offense and 
safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation 
as criminal. (3) Prescribe penalties which are proportion-
ate (emphasis supplied) to the seriousness of offenses ... " 
It is submitted that considering the above language, 
and the demise of the rule of strict construction not 
withstanding, that the last clause of the quoted language 
from Casperson (supra) is still good law and sensibly s0, 
if it may be repeated: 
13 
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" ... and nothing not within their words held to be within 
their meaning. 2 Bishop Criminal Law (9th Ed.) §415." 
(emphasis supplied) 
It is submitted that wher~given the standard set 
forth in Shondel (supra),and the language emphasized above 
in Casperson (supra), that the person of ordinary intelli-
gence, desiring to obey the law, could not read the lan-
guage of §76-6-404, "theft-elements,'' "a person commits 
theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control 
over the ,:roper;::," of another with a purpose to deprive 
him thereof." and §76-6-405(1), theft by deception, 
(1) "a person commits theft if he obtains or exercises 
control over property of another by deception and with a 
purpose to deprive him thereof." (both citations Utah 
Code Annot"ated as amended, 1953); and therefrom know that 
he would be committing a felony of the second degree if he 
sold a motor vehicle with an altered odometer reading 
knowing thereof and misrepresenting same. It is further 
submitted that such a result is not within the words of 
the two statutes cited and could therefore not properly 
be held to be within their meaning. 
14 
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Standards of fariness as well as of due process 
and equal protection of the laws demand that when conduct, 
which has been freely and frequently engaged in by a certain 
segment of society, is to be proscribed as criminal, there 
should be a clear showing of legislative intent to so 
proscribe such conduct and there should be clear warning 
and notice that such conduct in the future will be so 
punished. (It is elementary that there can be no ex-
post-facto laws.) 
It is submitted that the practice of altering 
odometers by used car dealers has in the past been such a 
wide spread practice that the Court could take judicial 
notice of it. 
To allow the present conviction to stand would be to 
allow a denial of due process and of equal protection of 
the law against the Appellant. 
POINT IV. ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT THERE WAS 
A THEFT, THE AMOUNT INVOLVED DID NOT 
EXCEED THE $1,000.00 REQUIRED FOR 
CONVICTION OF A FELONY OF THE SECOND 
DEGREE. 
For a conviction to be affirmed in the instant case, 
the state was obligated to prove theft of an amount of 
15 
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over $1,000.00. §76-6-412(a) (i) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended. As has already been cited by Appellant in 
Caspersen and Morris (supra), before a plaintiff could 
recover in a civil suit he would be required to show damages 
and where he could not there would be no recovery. As the 
Court has said "for stronger reasons" there must be a 
pecuniary or property loss before there can be a crime 
of obtaining money by false pretenses or as the current 
statutes provide, a theft. The State produced testimony 
uncontrovercej t: Appellant that the purchase price 
for the 1973 :hevrolet Monte Carlo in question was 
$2,830.00. But, there is also uncontroverted testimony 
that the complainants received a vehicle for their 
$2,830.00 the fair market value of which,was,at wholesale 
value $2,975.00 and at retail value worth an additional 
$750.00 or $3,725.00 (Transcript page 139) the complainants 
testified they liked the car and did not want Forshee 
to repurchase it or replace it. So there was not only 
no proof of theft of over $1.000.00 in satisfaction of 
the requirement for a second degree felony, there was no 
proof of a theft of any amount, and the Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss (Transcript page 104, page 117), 
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therefore, should have been granted. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons contained in the foregoing argument, 
the appellants' conviction for theft by deception, a felony 
of the second degree, should be reversed and he should be 
acquitted of the charge. There was no theft, no pecuniary 
or property loss, the complainants purchased an automobile 
they liked and would not return or exchange. If they can 
prove any such loss,they can recover in a civil action (which 
has been brought by them - tr. p. 67 line 27 - p. 68 line 22). 
When the complainants brought the matter of the mileage dis-
parity to Forshee, an agreement to appease the Smiths was 
entered into wherein Forshee would rebuild the engine in the 
vehicle and guarantee the transmission thereof for 60,000 
miles beyond that date. (tr. p. 75 line 11-16, p. 100, line 
10-15). They then are complainants in a trial where Forshee 
is convicted of a second degree felony. 
The language of the applicable statutes relating to theft 
and theft by deception must be tortured to be held to pro-
scribe the sale of a vehicle with an altered odometer whether 
with intent to deceive or not. If there was no deception, 
would the prosecution claim such a transaction was a plain 
out and out theft? The argument for that would be just as 
sound as for theft by deception, where deception was present. 
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That would at least be consistent, but the prosecution relies 
on the California cases earlier cited and would have the Court 
approve their inconsistency. The California cases say that 
the crime is the deception, that if a defendant had 
sold vehicles with altered odometers, and had said, yes, 
the indicated mileage is correct when it was not, there was 
then a crime; but if tbe defendant knew the mileage indicated 
was incorrect but remained silent about it, tf.ere was then no 
crime. This would be the result in the instant case if this 
Court affirms Forshee's conviction. If the evidence had shown 
Forshee to have been silent about the indicated mileage, or 
if it had show~ he had indicated he knew nothing about the 
indicated mileage,there would have been no intended deception 
for the buyer to rely on -- no crime -- no conviction. 
This is a case of first impression in this Court and to 
affirm the above thinking would set dangerous precedent. When 
a misrepresentative situation exists then, to avoid criminal 
liability one need merely be silent or profess no knowledge 
about the misrepresentation. 
It is submitted that if the California court's position 
was consistent, they would have to hold that if the crime is 
misrepresentation, that it is just as much a crime to sell a 
buyer a vehicle with incorrect mileage indicated and tell him 
nothing as to tell him it is correct mileage. For if it is~· 
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the first case a "theft by deception" it is therefore in the 
second case a "theft" without the deception. 
It becomes evident then that the only fair standard to 
use is that already established by this Ccurt is Morris and 
Casperson, supra: That the crime is the theft,and that there is 
no theft without pecuniary or property loss, therefore, in 
this case the conviction should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. KENDALL PERKINS 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
Twelve Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5835 
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